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DIVORCE PROBLEMS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
Divorce may be considered as the termination of the legal
relationship between husband and wife by an act of the law.
With the purely local aspect of legal questions regarding di-
vorce, Conflict of Laws is not concerned. If a husband and
wife are married and have their home in one state, legal
questions concerning their divorce are local matters only.
These will include the grounds for divorce, the particular court
in which the action is brought, the procedure to be followed
from commencement to termination of the action. In such a
case it is only when some question concerning the decree
comes up in another state that a Conflict of Laws question is
raised. This may be the recognition of the decree freeing
the parties from the bonds of matrimony, the effect to be
given to an order for alimony, marital rights in foreign prop-
erty, or the claim to custody of the children. The questions,
especially as among the states of the United States, are many,
and often difficult.
DOMICILE AS A BASIS FOR DIVORCE JURISDICTION
Our law considers the marriage relationship a matter in
which the state is concerned, as well as the individual hus-
band and wife. This is not the only possible view. It is con-
ceivable that the relation of matrimony, like any other con-
sensual transaction, might be considered the private affair of
the parties to the agreement, to be entered and dissolved at
*This article is the basis of a chapter on Divorce in a textbook on
Conflict of Laws, now in preparation by the writer, to be published by
the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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will., But this is not our way of looking at the question and
is not likely to be so long as much of our social structure, and
hence our law, is built around family relationships.
Divorce, since it concerns the termination of the marital
status, is a matter of state concern and an act of the law must
accomplish it. What law? The natural answer would be, the
law of that place with which the person is most intimately con-
cerned, the place "where he dwelleth and hath his home," in
other words, his domicile. It is the law of the domicile which
determines whether or not a marriage shall be terminated by
divorce.2  In marriage cases it is held that the marriage will
generally be recognized as good by the domiciliary law, if
valid by the law where contracted. This is not true of divorce.
Here there is no general policy favoring termination of the
relation. It is only allowed if at all upon statutory grounds.3
A divorce may be granted only for a cause recognized by the
domiciliary law; furthermore only a court at the domicile has
jurisdiction to grant divorce. This is true both in England,
'That marriage relations are of consequence to the state has not
always been the rule. In his interesting discussion on marriage and
divorce, Lord Bryce shows how under the Roman law the entrance
into and exit from the marriage relation was treated as the sole
business of the parties themselves. 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN LEGAL HISTORY, 782. Another instance is the marriage and divorce
customs of the American Indians.
20n the continent the national law governs. See LORENzEN'S CAS.,
564 note. But an American court has granted a divorce to one domi-
ciled within the state even though he had not yet become naturalized.
Cohen v. Cohen (Del.), 84 Atl. 122.
3South Carolina, by constitutional provision, forbids divorce. In
England absolute divorce has only been allowed, except by act of Par-
liament in individual cases, since the Matrimonial Causes Act of 20
and 21 VICT. c. 85. It is only as the law has departed from the view
of the church that marriage constituted a union indissoluble except by
death, that divorce is allowed at all. This is not true of a "limited"
divorce or judicial separation, or annulment of a marriage. It has been
held, too, that jurisdiction to grant divorces and annul marriages, never
having been exercised by the ordinary law courts of England, could not
be exercised by the courts of law in this country until vested in them
by the legislature. LeBarron v. LeBarron, 35 Vt. 365. On the question
of what courts are invested with jurisdiction, see the various statutes
and 17 CENT. DIG., Divorce, §§ 198, 199.
4LeMesurier v. LeMesurier [1895], A. C. 517; Bater v. Bater [1906],
P. 209; DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3rd. ed., pp. 46, 285, 291. There
had been some language in earlier Scottish decisions indicating that
the matrimonial domicile, in the sense of "the place of residence of the
DIVORCE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
and in the United States.5 In the language often used by
courts: "This necessarily results from the right of every
nation or state to determine the status of its own domiciled
citizens..."6 So it has been repeatedly held that a divorce
decree rendered where neither party is domiciled is not en-
titled to recognition in another state.7 The provision of the
United States Constitution (Art. IV, S 1) declaring that "full
faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state," does
not compel recognition of the decree, in the type of case under
consideration, for it is well settled that the record may be con-
tradicted as to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdic-
tion," and if the decree was not rendered at the domicile, there
was no jurisdiction in the international sense even though the
married pair for the time being" was the basis of jurisdiction. Jack v.
Jack, 24 Ct. Sess. 2nd. Ser. 467; Pitt v. Pitt, 1 Ct. Sess. 3rd Ser. 106.
These were disapproved in the LeMesurier case.
5In the following cases, neither party was domiciled where the decree
was rendered and it was denied recognition in another state. It was
also obtained by fraud upon the local court where it was rendered.
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U. S. 179, 21 Sup. Ct. 553; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W.
720; Sammons v. Pike (Minn.), 120 N. W. 540, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1254;
Carling v. Carling, 78 N. J. Eq. 42, 81 Atl. 565; Blondin v. Brooks,
83 Vt. 472, 76 Atl. 184. Accord, and exceedingly well discussed on this
point, Lister v. Lister, 86 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170. To the same effect,
though it did not appear whether the local rules had been complied with
or not, neither party being domiciled where the decree was granted.
Ger. Say. Soc. v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 24 Sup. Ct. 221; Litowich v.
Litowich, 19 Kan. 451, 27 Am. Rep. 145; Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me.
187, 3 Atl. 280; Thelan v. Thelan, 75 Minn. 433, 78 N. W. 108; Smith v.
Smith, 19 Neb. 706, 28 N. W. 296; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Tex. Civ. App.
315, 21 S. W. 154.
GEllis v. Ellis, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056.
7See cases, supra, note 5, and infra, note 9. See also exhaustive note,
59 L.R.A. 135. May we expect to see it decided that such a decree is
not entitled to recognition where rendered, also? Since the Fourteenth
Amendment, a money judgment rendered against a defendant not before
the court by virtue of allegiance, valid personal service or consent, is
void even in the jurisdiction where rendered. Riverside & D. R. Cotton
Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 35 Sup. Ct. 579. Could not the same
argument be applied to a case where a court has attempted to adjudi-
cate upon the status of persons domiciled elsewhere and so is without
jurisdiction in the international sense?
SThompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S.
555, 19 Sup. Ct. 506; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237,
are among numerous cases so holding.
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law of the state rendering the decree was complied with.9 A
person marrying again after such a "divorce" may be pros-
ecuted for bigamy.10 Whether both parties must have been
domiciled where the decree was rendered, or whether the
domicile of one is sufficient is discussed later.
The fact that both plaintiff and defendant have appeared in
the divorce suit will not entitle the decree to recognition if in
fact there was no domiciliary jurisdiction.11 Divorce juris-
diction is not a personal matter, to be conferred by consent of
the parties.12  An apparent exception is found in cases hold-
ing that the party procuring a divorce, having asserted the
authority of the court, cannot question the validity of the
decree in another state.13  This does not say the decree is
good, however, but simply precludes the individual who ob-
tained the divorce from taking advantage of his own wrong.
DECREE SUBJECT TO RULES OF DOMICILIARY LAW
In granting a divorce the state of the domicile exercises its
power to determine the civil status of persons subject to its
jurisdiction.- The process of divorce is provided for be-
cause the law-making body deems it for the best interests of
9Where a jurisdiction by its local law purports to grant divorces to
persons not domiciled therein, decrees so obtained are not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21;
Van Fossen v. State, 37 Oh. St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507.
'0 Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; State v. Fleak, 54 Iowa
429; People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247; State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29;
Van Fossen v. State, 37 Oh. St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507.
"Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237; Lister v. Lister,
86 N. X. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170. Distinguish this situation where ifeither
party has a domicile where the divorce is granted from that where
there is domiciliary jurisdiction as to one party and personal appear-
ance by the other. In such case, appearance is important. This point
is discussed infra, and see authorities cited L.R.A. 1917 B 1041.
12See the language of the court in Andrews v. Andrews, supra.
131n re Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W. 1056, 23 L.R.A. 287,
43 Am. St. Rep. 514; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E.
193, 93 Am. St. Rep. 631; Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576.
See Ellis v. White, 61 Ia. 644 (attack on decree in state where ren-
dered).
"4"The state has the absolute right to determine or alter the civil
status of all its inhabitants, no matter where they may temporarily be,
and no matter where the contracts, or acts giving rise to such a status,
may have been made or done." Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me. 187, 3 Atl.
280.
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the parties and the state that, under certain conditions, which
it sets out as grounds for divorce, individuals should not
longer be compelled to maintain the relations of husband and
wife. Whether divorce is to be granted depends upon the
domiciliary law,1 subject to the qualifications which follow.
It will not matter whether the acts complained of were cause
for divorce where they took place, for a divorce action is not
simply a personal claim against the offending party, which,
like a transitory cause of action for tort, may be enforced
against the offender wherever he is found. Nor will it matter
what the law which created the marriage says about divorce,
whether it gives many causes for divorce or none.16  The
question is one of policy for the law-making body of the state
where the parties now have their home. It must decide under
what circumstances persons subject to its control may be re-
leased from marital obligations.
The domiciliary law may specify grounds for divorce with-
out regard to where the acts of the wrong-doing party were
done, or where the husband and wife were domiciled at the
time the acts were done. It is worth repeating that the divorce
suit is not the enforcing of a claim of one spouse against an-
other, but the determination of the question whether the par-
ties should be compelled to continue the relation of husband
and wife. But the law of a state may, and sometimes does,
provide that in addition to the requirement that the parties be
"The court at the domicile has jurisdiction to decree divorce even
though the acts were done outside the state, and the parties at that
time were domiciled elsewhere. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 10 Ind. 436; Stewart
v. Stewart, 32 Idaho 180, 180 Pac. 165; Rose v. Rose, 132 Minn. 340,
156 N. W. 664; Jones v. Jones, 67 Miss. 195, 6 So. 712; Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R. I. 87; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662, 62 Am. Dec. 702; STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 8th ed., § 230a.
'6A divorce granted at the domicile will be recognized at the place of
marriage though given for cause not recognized by the law creating the
marriage. Bater v. Bater, L. R. [1906] P. 209, 5 B. R. C. 717 and
authorities cited in note 5 B. R. C. 747. Jurisdiction for divorce cannot
be founded on the fact that the parties were married and at that time
had their domicile in the state where a decree is sought. Harrison v.
Harrison, 20 Ala. 629, 56 Am. Dec. 227; Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick.
181, 25 Am. Dec. 372. Nor does the fact that the parties were married
elsewhere and at that time were domiciled elsewhere deprive the court
where they are now domiciled of jurisdiction. Harteau v. Harteau,
supra; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662,
62 Am. Dec. 702.
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domiciled where a decree is sought, the misconduct complained
of for which divorce is to be granted, take place while parties
are there domiciled, 60 or that it be recognized as grounds for
divorce by the law of their former domicile if the alleged mis-
conduct took place when they lived elsewhere. 7
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR JURISDICTION
As has been stated, a divorce decree must have been granted
by a court of the domicile if it is to have recognition elsewhere.
The term used in statutes prescribing requirements for divorce
actions is generally "residence." This is almost uniformly
interpreted as meaning domicile.1 8 In addition to the require-
ment that one must be domiciled within a state before he can
get a divorce there, statutes frequently require residence for
a given period of time. Such a provision may be interpreted
to mean that the individual must have been domiciled within
the jurisdiction for this period, 19 or, as sometimes held, that he
or she must not only have been domiciled, but have an actual
residence there for the prescribed time as well.
20
Such conditions may be enacted by the law-making body of
any state as a matter of local policy. To secure a divorce a
party must comply with them. They do not affect the inter-
national requirement for jurisdiction which is based on domi-
cile, but are additions to it.
loaNicholas v. Maddox, 52 La. Ann. 1493, 27 So. 966; Norris v. Norris,
64 N. H. 523, 15 Atl. 19; See Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts. 349, 32 Am.
Dec. 767. See 59 L.R.A. 155 et seq. for full citations on this point.
'7 See Perzel v. Perzel, 91 Ky. 634, 15 S. W. 658.
'8 Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa 36; Bechtel v. Bechtel, 101 Minn. 511, 112
N. W. 883, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1100; Hamill v. Talbott, 81 Mo. App. 210;
deMeli v. deMeli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996; Graham v. Graham,
9 N. D. 88, 81 N. W. 44. To the same effect, on different wording of a
statute, see Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91 N. E. 394. Contra,
Wallace v. Wallace, 62 N. J. Eq. 509, 50 Atl. 788, and see Fleming v.
Fleming, 36 Nev. 135, 134 Pac. 445, actual residence but not domicile
required.
-9 Bechtel v. Bechtel, 101 Minn. 511, 112 N. W. 883; Miller v. Miller,
88 Vt. 134, 92 Atl. 9. See, on the question of character of residence
necessary, notes in 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1100; 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 992;
L.R.A. 1915 D. 852.
2OTrinchard v. Grace, 152 La. 942, 94 So. 856; Dickinson v. Dickinson
(Tex. Civ. App.), 138 S. W. 205.
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RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE GRANTED AT DOMICILE OF BOTH
PARTIES
A divorce decree granted in accordance with the local rules
of the place where given, and rendered by a court of a state
where both parties are domiciled will be recognized as valid
everywhere.2 1 As between the states of the United States such
recognition will be afforded not only by the general rule of
Conflict of Laws (sometimes called "by comity") but by the
compulsory force of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution.
DECREE OF DIVORCE AT DOMICILE OF ONE PARTY ONLY
The difficult situation in Conflict of Laws arises when a
decree is granted at the domicile of one party only. If a hus-
band and wife can have, in the eyes of the law, but one domi-
cile, the question is simple, from the standpoint of international
jurisdiction. If the decree was rendered where the parties
were domiciled, it is valid and entitled to recognition; if not,
it will not be recognized. Determination of the domicile point
may be a difficult question of fact but the legal proposition is
clear enough.
While by English law there is no exception to the rule that
husband and wife have the same domicile, which is fixed by
the husband, American courts have gone far in recognizing the
legal power of thewife to establish her own separate domicile.
22
She may for many purposes, certainly to sue for divorce, estab-
lish her separate domicile and bring her action there.23 From
21Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525; Standridge v.
Standridge, 31 La. 223. See Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 Sup.
Ct. 679. This is equally true in cases where the defendant, a resident
of the state, but temporarily absent, is served by publication. Harrison
v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 12; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217, 28 Am. Rep. 129.
So in Miller v. Miller, 128 N. Y. S. 787, the court recognized a divorce
granted in Russia by a rabbi, authorized to act in the matter; and in
Kapigian v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412, 99 N. E. 264, Ann. Cas.
1913 D. 535, recognition was given to the Turkish rule terminating
marriage, both parties being domiciled there at the time of such ter-
mination.
22See a collection of authorities, 20 MicH. L. REv. 86.
23If courts at the place where one spouse is domiciled have jurisdic-
tion in the international sense to render a valid decree, it would not,
on principle, make any difference whether the action was brought at the
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this set of facts come the hard questions. What is to be the
effect of such a decree in another state, on general principles
of Conflict of Laws or under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution? Does the decree free one spouse or both?
Is it material whether the defendant in the action was per-
sonally served with process in the state where the decree was
rendered or merely given actual notice or constructive notice
by publication without the borders of the state? In the latter,
is a personal judgment for alimony of any effect?
Before setting out the results reached by the authorities,
an analysis of the principles involved should be helpful. A
decree of divorce (leaving out of consideration for the present
the subject of alimony) is not a personal judgment secured by
one person against another, but an act operating upon the
marital relation between husband and wife. It is often spoken
of as an action in rem, the res being the marriage status. As-
an action in rem it must be brought where the res is situated,
that place being the domicile. Whether this figurative ex-
planation is taken, or whether it is simply said that the court
of the party's domicile has the power to control his domestic
relations, the result is the same. Suppose then, the wife estab-
lishes a domicile in Michigan and the husband is domiciled in
Ohio. The wife sues for divorce in Michigan and is granted
a decree. Does the Michigan court have jurisdiction? There
is no escape from admitting that it does, if jurisdiction for
divorce depends upon domicile, and a wife may have a sep-
arate domicile. Michigan laws may free this woman from
her husband in the exercise of its power to determine the status
of its citizens. If Michigan law may change her status from
married to single, her position as a single woinan should be
recognized everywhere. Further, compulsory recognition
domicile of plaintiff or defendant. The action may be brought at the
domicile of either spouse. Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156; Watkins v.
Watkins, 135 Mass. 83. But statutes commonly provide that the party:
seeking the divorce shall be domiciled at the forum. It has been held,
under such provisions, that a wife who is resident elsewhere cannot
sue at the domicile of her husband. White v. White, 18 R. I. 292,
27 Atl. 506; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651. That a nonresident may
have a decree on a cross bill where the plaintiff is a resident is held in
Jenness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 335 and Clutton v. Glutton,
108 Mich. 267, 66 N. W. 52. Contra, Valk v. Valk, 18 R. I. 639, 29 AtI.
499.
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should follow in sister states of the United States under the
full faith and credit clause. If the state of Michigan has
power to act on this woman's marriage relation because she
has a domicile in the state, that jurisdiction is not affected by
failure to serve process upon the husband within the state.
Due process of law may require notice so as to afford reason-
able opportunity for him to defend. But the action is not a
personal one; it has already been shown that presence of both
parties before the court does not confer jurisdiction without
domicile. Service upon the defendant within the state should
only be important when a personal judgment (such as an
order to pay alimony) is sought.
The husband, in the hypothetical case stated, is domiciled
in Ohio. What should be the effect, upon him, of the decree
in Michigan dissolving the bonds* of matrimony between him
and the Michigan wife? There is a possible argument for
saying it does not affect the husband at all. Michigan, it
might be said, may change the status of its own citizens, but
the very process of reasoning which gives Michigan power to
act upon the status of the Michigan woman denies the power
to affect the Ohio man. Therefore he is still married, and if
he now marries another woman he is guilty of bigamy. In
answer to such a view of the matter it may be pertinently
asked, who is the wife of this married man ? If Michigan could
free the wife from the husband the necessary consequence is
also to free the husband from her. The logically difficult
step was taken when courts said the wife could have a separate
domicile and sue for divorce there. This was done because of
the hardship wrought by the rigid rule that the wife's domicile
followed that of her husband. Having taken this step it is
illogical in principle and unjust to the parties not to recognize
its necessary consequences. The conception of a husband
without a wife or a wife without a husband may be a meta-
physical possibility, but it is a reproach to the common law
whose courts and lawyers have always prided themselves upon
freedom from mere theoretical speculation and boasted of
actual contact with hard fact.
The only tenable doctrine, it is submitted, is to recognize
fully the effects of a divorce to liberate both parties when
granted at the actual domicile of either. It is better to insist
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upon the unyielding doctrine that husband and wife must
always have the same domicile than to adopt the rule allowing
the wife to sue for divorce at a separate domicile and then to
refuse to recognize the necessary consequences of such a step.
"FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT" FOR DECREES OF DIVORCE RENDERED
AT DOMICILE OF ONE PARTY
The recognition which the courts of one state can be com-
pelled to afford to a divorce decree rendered by a court of a
sister state depends upon what is decided upon the subject by
the Supreme Court of the United States under Art. IV, Sec. 1
of the Constitution providing that "full faith and credit shall
be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state." This being a constitutional
question, the Supreme Court's adjudication is final and bind-
ing .authority. It has already been stated that if the decree
was rendered where both parties were domiciled it must be
recognized in a sister state; if where neither was domiciled it
need not be. On the question of the recognition which the
Constitution demands where the decree is rendered at the do-
micile of one party only there are two leading cases. The
first is Atherton v. Atherton, 4 decided in 1901. The parties
were married in New York and immediately went to live in
Kentucky where the husband had lived prior to his marriage.
Later the wifd left the husband and returned to New York
to live. In that state she sued the husband for a divorce from
bed and board alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. The
defendant's answer set up a decree of divorce which he had
obtained in Kentucky, after the wife had left him, on the
ground of desertion. She was not served personally in that
action in Kentucky, nor had she appeared, but notice of the
proceedings had been sent her in accordance with the Ken-
tucky statutes. The New York court held that the Kentucky
decree was inoperative against the wife, and gave judgment
in her favor. This judgment was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court on the ground that full faith and credit
had been denied the Kentucky decree. The court, in confin-
ing its decision to the facts before it,25 mentions the fact that
24181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544.
25 Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Haddock v. Haddock, inf'a, corn-
DIVORCE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Kentucky was the only matrimonial domicile of husband and
wife.
The other leading case is Haddock v. Haddock,2 6 which came
five years later. The parties were married in New York
where both lived at the time. The husband later went to
Connecticut, established his domicile there, and secured a
divorce in that state, the absent wife being served by publica-
tion only. Later the wife brought a separation suit against
Haddock in New York. He set up, in defense, the decree he
had received in Connecticut. This was rejected by the court
in New York proceedings. Upon final appeal to the United
States Supreme Court it was held that there was no violation
of the requirement of full faith and credit.
The decision, and the important point it involves has pro-
voked much discussion and the result of the case has been the
subject of much adverse criticism. 27  Haddock v. Haddock does
not purport to overrule Atherton v. Atherton. Moreover, the
latter decision has been cited and followed in a later case.
2 8
The difference in fact between the two cases rests upon the
point that in the Atherton Case the decree was rendered against
the absent non-resident defendant at the matrimonial domicile
of the husband and wife; in the Haddock Case it was not.
Why that makes a difference the majority opinion in the Had-
dock Case does not say. In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice
Holmes says, ".... I cannot see any ground for distinguishing
between the extent of jurisdiction in the matrimonial domicile
and that, admitted to exist to some extent, in a domicile later
ments on this fact as follows: "Evidently I should say, from internal
evidence, in deference to scruples which he did not share."
2 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, a five to four decision with dissenting
opinions by Justice Brown and Justice Holmes.
27The subject is dicussed in the following references, by no means an
exhaustive list: Articles, "Constitutional Protection of Decrees of Di-
vorce," 19 HARV. L. REv. 586; "The Doctrine of Haddock V. Haddock,"
1 ILL. L. REv. 219; "Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York," 10 BENCH
& BAR 82; "The Full Faith and Credit Clause ... as Applied to Suits
for Divorce," 15 ILL. L. REv. 259; "Divorce and the Federal Constitu-
tion," 49 AMER. L. REv. 852; "Extraterritorial Effect of Decree for
Divorce," etc., 45 AMER. L. REv. 564; "Ex parte Divorce," 28 HARv. L.
REv. 457. The following notes are in point: 13 COL. L. REv. 241;
12 LAW NOTES 142; 11 MicH. L. REv. 508; 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298;
13 MICH. L. REV. 420.
28Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129.
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acquired." Whether the distinction is logical or not it is made
by the court of last resort on this question and must stand until
displaced. A divorce decree rendered by a court at the mat-
rimonial domicile, in accordance with the prescribed pro-
cedure, must be recognized in another state under the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution, even as against
a non-resident defendant who was not served within the state
and who did not appear in the suit. But a decree rendered
at the separate domicile of one party only against a non-
resident under similar circumstances need not, as a matter
of federal compulsion, be so recognized.
From the language used in the Supreme Court decisions
mentioned it seems that "matrimonial domicile" means noth-
ing more than the place where the parties last lived as hus-
band and wife with the intent of making that place their
home, and which was still the domicile of the one spouse when
the divorce action was brought. The use of the term in sev-
eral recent decisions supports this description.2 9 This is the
natural meaning of the term. It seems neither necessary nor
desirable to make further complications in an already tangled
question by ascribing to the words a more difficult meaning.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF DECREE IN SECOND STATE
The decision in Haddock v. Haddock did not decide that New
York, or any other state could not recognize the Connecticut
decree. It was expressly said that Connecticut could divorce
the husband, a citizen of Connecticut, and that the decree could
be effective in that state. What the court did hold was that
the full faith and credit clause did not compel recognition by
New York. Recognition could be afforded this decree, how-
ever, under general rules applicable in, all Conflict of Laws
cases. The second state should give full recognition to the
29Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841; Callahan 'v. Calla-
han, 121 N. Y. S. 39; Hall v. Hall, 123 N. Y. S. 1056; Benham v. Benham,
125 N. Y. S. 923; People v. Catlin, 126 N. Y. S. 350; Post v. Post, 129 N. Y.
S. 754; State ex rel Aldrach v. Morse, 31 Utah 213, 87 Pac. 705, 7 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1127. See also "Matrimonial Domicile," 27 YALu L. .Joua. 49,
59-65. Other decisions in lower courts in New York have said that
there is no matrimonial domicile in New York if one spouse has de-
serted the other in that state, prior to the latter's removal from the
state. North v. North, 93 N. Y. S. 512; Hatch v. Hatch, 187 N. Y. S. 568.
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divorce decree rendered as the one in the Haddock case was,
because international requirements of jurisdiction have been
met. That the decree should be recognized was the majority
view of state courts prior to the decision in the Haddock Case,30
and has continued to be the prevailing doctrine since.31 The
unfortunate thing about the present state of the law is the
uncertainty which is created in the legal status of families in-
volved. Certainty in domestic relations is as surely impera-
tively demanded as it is in commercial transactions. The mi-
nority of states which refuses to recognize the foreign decree
given under the same circumstances as that in the Haddock
case continues to do so 32 and the high authority of the Supreme.
Court may influence other state courts to follow the line of
30Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am.
Rep. 21; Van Orsdal v. Van Orsdal, 67 Ia. 35, 24 N. W. 579; Ditson V.
Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Shafer v. Bushnell, 24 Wis. 372 (but see Cook v.
Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 14. W. 33, 443). Authorities on the subject are
collected in notes in 59 L.R.A. 135, 167; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 647; L.R.A.
1917 B. 1032. Of the states refusing to acknowledge the foreign decree,
the most conspicuous is New York. See People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78,
32 Am. Rep. 274. Other states where the minority rule is followed,
or which are in the doubtful group are the District of Columbia, Massa-
chusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. New Jersey, prior to adoption of the Uniform Act, made
recognition depend upon whether the absent defendant was given actual
notice of the pending suit. Felt v. Felt, 59 N. J. Eq. 606, 45 Atl. 105,
49 Atl. 1071, 83 Am. St. Rep. 612; Davenport v. Davenport, 67 N. J. Eq.
320, 58 Atl. 535. See also Solomon v. Solomon, 140 Ga. 379, 78 S. E. 1079.
While requiring notice of the suit to be brought to the opposing party
seems good legislative policy, it confers "no higher or greater authority
on the court to hear and determine the cause than service by publica-
tion." McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31, 41. See Smith v. Smith,
43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So. 248.
3'Gildesleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684; Joyner v.
Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182 (but see Solomon v. Solomon, 140 Ga.
379, 78 S. E. 1079, no recognition if there had been no actual knowledge
of suit by absent defendant); Howard v. Strole, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S. W.
792; Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977; Douglas v.
Teller, 53 Wash. 695, 102 Pac. 761. Statutes in Kansas and Indiana
provide for recognition. See Hilbish v. Hattel, 145 Ind. 59, 44 N. E.
20; McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31, 107 Pac. 546.
32Baylis v. Baylis, 207 N. Y. 446, 101 N. E. 176; Kaiser v. Kaiser,
233 N. Y. 524, 135 N. E. 902. Recent New York cases have held,
seemingly cutting down the effect of earlier decisions, that the policy
of that state does not preclude the recognition of a foreign decree,
based on constructive service against a non-resident, where the de-
fendant in such suit was not a resident of New York. Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508; Schenker v. Schenker,'228 N. Y.
600, 127 N. E. 921. But such decree must be valid by the law of the
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reasoning by which recognition was refused.3 3  We are left
in the most unfortunate situation in which a man and woman
may be considered husband and wife in one state and not in
another.
EFFECT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT
Authorities have already been cited to the effect that a
divorce decree rendered where neither party is domiciled will
not be recognized elsewhere, even though both spouses were
before the court rendering the decree. Suppose, however, that
the plaintiff is domiciled where divorce is sought, and there
has been a decree rendered against the defendant following
personal service upon him within the state, or his voluntary
appearance in the action. The court in Haddock v. Haddock
cites and certainly does not disapprove of an earlier decision,35
absentee defendant's domicile. Ball v. Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E.
106. See interesting comment on this case anent the renvoi doctrine
by Lorenzen, 31 YALE L. JoUR. 191. The large number of cases in the
lower New York courts are cited in the L.R.A. notes supra. In Gross-
man's Estate, 263 Pa. 139, 106 Atl. 86, where the foreign decree was
refused recognition, it seems doubtful whether there was domiciliary
jurisdiction of either party to the divorce action.
3 3Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186. This was a case in a federal court
in Texas. In a later Texas case, Richmond v. Sangster, 217 S. W. 723,
the court expressly disclaims intention to hold that a foreign decree
of divorce, rendered upon substituted service, is void. In Perkins V.
Perkins, 225 Mass. 82, 113 N. E. 841, the court refused to recognize a
Georgia decree given against a nonresident wife. She had not had
knowledge of the proceedings in Georgia. The court does not pass upon
the question whether the decree would have been recognized if she had
had such knowledge.
3 4The following comment by the annotator in 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 647,
655, seems a sound and sane statement of the point. ". . . The United
States Supreme Court should definitely and finally decide whether a
divorce suit is governed by the principles applicable to a suit in personam
or a suit in rem; and, if they take the former view . . . they should,
as logical consistency and practical morality require, refrain from con-
sidering the validity of the decree in the state where rendered, or, if
the occasion arises, affirmatively declare the decree invalid in that state.
If, upon the other hand . . . the validity of such a decree in the state
where rendered is so thoroughly established . . . that it can no longer
be questioned, then that court should hold that the decree is entitled
to recognition under the full faith and credit provision, and no longer
leave it optional with the court of other states to recognize or refuse
to recognize it upon general principles of comity. Either alternative
would have the inestimable advantage over the present condition of
giving the parties the same status in all the states . .
3 5Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108.
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holding that a decree rendered under such circumstances is
entitled to recognition in other states under the "full faith
and credit" clause. It may perhaps be urged that the personal
appearance of the defendant cannot add to the efficacy of the
decree. Divorce jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere
presence of the parties. This is shown by the cases refusing
recognition to decrees rendered where both parties appeared
but where neither was domiciled at the forum. If jurisdiction
depends upon the fact of domicile, why should the personal
appearance of the defendant matter? Whether logical or not,
there should be no quarrel with a rule that tends to make for
uniformity in recognition in matters of domestic relations.
Recent cases indicate that a personal appearance by the de-
fendant will eliminate any objection to a decree rendered at
the domicile of one party only.3 6
UNIFORM STATUTE
A uniform statute upon the subject of divorce has carried
the recommendation of the National Conference on Unif6rm
State Laws since 1907, though very few states have adopted
it. 37 The general adoption of this legislation would remove
one cause of the present tangle by making causes for divorce
the same in each state, thus removing the inducement to mi-
gration for divorce purposes. It continues the present prac-
tice of service by publication in case of non-resident defendants
though it also provides for a personal notice in addition where
practicable. The statute also contains a provision for giving
full faith and credit to decrees of other states where rendered
in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional requirements
of the uniform statute.38 General adoption of this act would do
36Rupp v. Rupp, 141 N. Y. S. 484; Richards v. Richards, 149 N. Y. S.
1028; Pearson v. Pearson, 176 N. Y. S. 626; Bidwell v. Bidwell, 139 N. C.
402, 52 S. E. 55; Comm. v. Parker, 59 Pa. (Super Ct.( 14. But not where
the only appearance was a motion to vacate for irregularities and defects
and want of jurisdiction. Weaver v. Weaver, 160 N. Y. S. 642.
37The statute is set out in TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAWS, p. 291 et seq.
3SThe statute does not leave everything sun-clear, however. It is pro-
vided that a divorce decree is not to be recognized when an inhabitant
of the state goes elsewhere to get a divorce for acts which occurred
while he was such inhabitant. This comes from a Massachusetts statute,
under which it was held that the effect was but to enact the common
law rule that a divorce granted where the party was not domiciled
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
much to remove the confusion and conflict of authority now
existing. But such general adoption seems, at the present
-rate of progress, a matter for the indefinite future. Congres-
sional legislation has also been advocated. Whether this is de-
sirable, if authorized by constitutional amendment, involves a
question of policy beyond the scope of this discussion.
LIMITED DIVORCE
Limited divorce, or divorce a mensma et thoro, differs enough
from the now more common absolute divorce to require sep-
arate discussion. A divorce from bed and board could be
granted by an ecclesiastical court in England at a time when
no court there could decree a dissolution of a valid marriage.
Such a decree did not sever the marriage bonds, though it
made important changes with respect to the rights of the
spouses against and obligations to each other. But, as Coke
says of the wife's position after such a decree, "the overture
continueth."'39
In England a suit for judicial separation, the statutory suc-
cessor to the divorce from bed and board, need not be brought
at the domicile of the parties, but can be maintained in Eng-
land if they are resident there.40 Residence is necessary be-
cause the courts in this matter act upon the same rules as did
their predecessors, the ecclesiastical courts, which prior to the
Act of 1857 dealt with cases involving marital difficulties.
The jurisdiction of these courts did not depend upon na-
would not be recognized. Gregory v. Gregory, 76 Me. 535. See also
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237. But New Jersey,
under the Uniform Statute, has said the rule against recognition
applies, even though a bona fide domicile was in fact acquired in the
other state. Sechler v. SechIer (N. J. Eq.), 118 Atl. 629; and further,
even though the defendant has appeared in the action or been per-
sonally served within the state. Lister v. Lister, 86 N. J. Eq. 30,
97 Atl. 170. Either this construction of the statute is wrong, or the
statute, in this respect is unconstitutional unless the Supreme Court
changes its view on full faith and credit. See authorities, notes 35 and
36. See also discussion in 21 MICH. L. REv. 922.
39CoRE ON LirTLToN, 235a. The effect of limited divorce on various
marital relations is set out in a note in 65 Am. Dec. 359. In England
it is doubtful whether after such a decree a woman can even acquire a
separate domicile. Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey [1921], 1 A. C. 146.
4 OArmytage v. Armytage [1898], P. 178; Anghinelli v. Anghinelli
[19183, P. 247. For fuller statement of the English authorities, see
DIc EY, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3rd ed. p. 296.
DIVORCE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
tionality or domicile of the parties. Residence within a parish
was enough to place one's soul under the care of the parish
priest, and to give the ecclesiastical court authority to deal
with him "pro salute anime."
'4 1
Statutes in this country in states where limited divorces are
granted frequently make the same requirements for bringing
the suit and for the procedure therein for limited as for ab-
solute divorce.42 What recognition should or must be given
a divorce a mensa granted by a court of another state? A
decree rendered at the domicile, with the defendant before the
court by valid personal service or appearance must be given
full faith and credit.43 Suppose such a decree rendered against
an absent non-resident, who does not appear. A recent deci-
sion in Connecticut holds that the decree rendered on such
facts will not be given effect in that state.44  Had this been an
absolute divorce decree Connecticut would have recognized it
as valid, even though not compelled by the Constitution to do
so.45 But a decree of judicial separation was said not to affect
status ;it is a personal action, not one in rem, and hence en-
titled to no recognition against a non-resident, non-appearing
defendant. Whether recognition of foreign limited divorce
cases may be withheld on this broad ground is doubtful. The
United States Supreme Court has held that such a decree,
rendered at the "matrimonial domicile" must be given full
faith and credit.46 There is little authority to rely upon.
47
It seems a fair statement from the cases cited to say a limited
divorce decree must be given faith and credit when an abso-
41See James, L. J. in Niboyet v. Niboyet, 4 P. D. 1.
42For examples, see MIca. ComP. LAWS, 1915, ch. 217; MINN. REV.
LAwS, 1905, § 3601. The Uniform Statute makes the same procedural
and jurisdictional requirements. *43Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct. 679 (Illinois decree
authorizing wife to live apart conclusive upon husband suing for divorce
in California); Slade v. Slade, 58 Me. 157.
44Pettis v. Pettis, 91 Conn. 608, 101 Atl. 13, 4 A.L.R. 852; reviewed
in 17 COL. L. REv. 639 and 27 YALE L. JouR. 117.
45Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 692, 92 Atl. 684.
46Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129. This de-
cision followed Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544,
on its facts and does not discuss nor apparently notice the possibility
of a difference between absolute and limited divorce as concerns its
character as a decree in rem or the recognition required for "full faith
and credit."47See note in 4 A.L.R. 858.
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lute decree rendered under the same circumstances is within
the constitutional protection. But if not protected by the full
faith and credit clause, a court may, as the Connecticut court
has done, give effect to an absolute decree, while refusing it to
a divorce from bed and board.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
It has been stated by an eminent authority that a suit to
annul a marriage concerns the marriage status precisely like
one to break the marriage bond for post nuptial wrongdoing
and should therefore be carried on in the courts of the domi-
cile. 48 But there is an important difference between divorce
and annulment. A decree of divorce dissolves the marriage
and relieves the parties from their obligations as husband and
wife; but it recognizes that the relation had a lawful existence,
of which the consequences continue, even though the relation
has terminated.49  This a nullity decree does not do. It is
granted for causes antedating the marriage and its legal effect
is to say that the marriage never existed.
50 The ecclesiastical
law did not permit a valid marriage to be dissolved in the life
time of the parties. But it did allow annulment decrees; these
did not purport to end a marriage but declared that one had
never come into being. Coke and Blackstone both speak of
divorce a vinculo, but it is clear that they are referring to an-
nulment.5 1
4 8
BISHOP ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, § 73. An attempt
to differentiate has been called a mere juggling with terms, Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 117 N. Y. S. 671; and a "mere difference in form," Turner v.
Thompson, 13 P. D. 37.
4 9Thus, the offspring born or conceived during the wedlock are legiti-
mate, Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95; personal choses of the wife, reduced to
possession by the husband, remain his, Lawson v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 630;
confidential communications between them during the marriage are not
admissible in evidence, Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N. E. 820.
59Thus, communication between the parties prior to the decree are not
"privileged" as are those between husband and wife, Wells v. Fletcher,
5 Car and P. 12; the husband acquires no right in the wife's property,
Aughtie v. Aughtie, 1 Phill. Ecc. 201; the woman may maintain an
action against the man for wrongful cohabitation, Blossom 'v. Barrett,
37 N. Y. 434; unless a statute protects the children they are illegitimate.
1 BISHOP, § 277, 2 same § 1602. Of course all of these consequences
are subject to modification by statute.
5 1
COKE ON LITTLETON, 235a; 1 BLACKSTONE CoM. 440 et seq. "When
such expressions as divorce a vinculo occur, they always refer to cases
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Does the wide difference between annulment and divorce
decrees necessitate a rule of jurisdiction to annul a marriage
which differs from that for divorce? The difficulties inherent
in the problem can be shown by supposing an entirely possible
case.52  Suppose cousins, domiciled in state A, marry there
and live successively in states B. C, and D. Assume that by
A law the marriage is valid but that by the law of D such a
marriage is incestuous. Granted that a court in D could
divorce these people, thus ending the marriage, could it grant
a nullity decree and thus declare all their prior cohabitation
illicit and the children bastards? Would a court in A, B, or C
give credit to such a decree? On principle, it could well be
maintained that since a nullity decree declares that no mar-
riage ever existed, such a decree can only be rendered by the
court of a state whose law created the marriage relation.
5 3
Authorities upon the point are lacking in clarity and con-
sistency. English writers state that the English courts may
declare a marriage a nullity in two situations: first where the
marriage was celebrated in England ;54 and second where the
respondent is resident in England at the date of the petition.
55
But English courts have refused to recognize foreign nullity
decrees rendered upon the same jurisdictional facts as those
upon which an English court will act when nullity is asked for
in England. In Ogden v. Ogden56 the Court of Appeal held
where there never existed a vinculum, and the so-called marriage was
never a marriage at all." Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R. 4 Eq. Co. S, 162,
166.
52Garcia v. Garcia, 25 S. D. 645, 127 N. W. 586 is nearly like it.
53See "Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage," 32 HARv. L. REV. 806.
54Linke v. Van Aerde, 10 T. L. R. 426; Sottomayer v. DeBarros,
3 P. D. 1; Simonin v. Mallac, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67.
5
5WEsTLAxE, PRrv. INT. LAw, 5th ed., art. 49; FOOTE'S PnrV. INT.
JuRis., 4th ed., 123; HALSBuRY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 265; DIcEy, CON-
FLICT oF LAWS, 3rd ed., 300. This last edition of Dicey suggests an
additional basis, where the parties are domiciled in England. On suit
for annulment in England where parties are domiciled there though
married elsewhere, see Bonaparte v. Bonaparte [1892], P. 402; John-
son v. Cook [1898], 2 I. R. 130; Bater v. Bater [1906], P. 209. In the
cases cited by Westlake for the point that residence is sufficient (Nibo-
yet v. Niboyet, 4 P. D. 1; Roberts v. Brennan [1902], P. 143) the
judges were trying to establish that under ecclesiastical law, residence
as something less than domicile, was sufficient. The question of juris-
diction was being considered in its local and not its international aspect.
56[1908] P. 46. See also Simonin v. Mallac. 2 Sw. & Tr. 67. The
French court had the same basis for jurisdiction as in Bater v. Bater,
or Johnson v. Cook, supra.
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that a decree of a French court annulling a marriage between
a Frenchman and an Englishwoman, contracted in England,
was not entitled to recognition. It is stated as Efiglish law
that a decree of nullity of a foreign court is not conclusive in
England.
57
Among the American authorities general statements may be
found to the effect that in annulment, as in divorce, jurisdic-
tion depends on domicile.58 Cases may be found where a mar-
riage is annulled when the parties were domiciled at the time
of marriage in the state where action is brought though the
ceremony took place elsewhere; other decisions refuse annul-
ment on such facts.60 A foreign nullity decree based on
domicile has been accorded6 and refused
2 recognition. Sta-
tutes in some states make requirements for annulment and
divorce actions the same both as to jurisdiction and procedure.
6 3
The Uniform Divorce and Annulment statute also makes pro-
vision for bringing the action where either party is a resident,
and allows service by publication upon absent defendants.
4
This method is certainly the convenient one and follows the
well settled rules in divorce actions. It is to be hoped that
some one rule governing both jurisdiction for actions and rec-
ognition of foreign decrees will be settled upon soon. If not,
confusion worse than that existing in the divorce situation
may be expected.
57HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENG. 271; FooTE's PRIV. INT. JURIs., 4th ed.
114.
58BISHOP, supra, note 48; KEEZER ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, § 56;
26 Cyc. 908.
5'Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845; Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 117 N. Y. S. 671; Barney v. Cuness, 68 Vt. 51, 33 Atl. 897;
Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789.
6OLevy v. Downing, 213 Mass. 334, 100 N. E. 638. In Garcia v. Garcia,
25 S. D. 645, 127 N. W. 546 annulment was refused where the marriage
was valid by the lex loci contractus and the law of the domicile of the
parties at the time it was celebrated. New Jersey has refused to annul
a marriage contracted within the state, Blumenthal v. Tannenholz, 31
N. J. Eq. 194; and has granted it when neither party was domiciled
within the state and the marriage did not take place there. Avakian v.
Avakian, 69 N. J. Eq. 89, 60 Atl. 521.
61Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35, a very hard case.
62Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 21 N. E. 435.
63IowA CODE [1897], § 3183 and Supp., § 3187a; NEB. CoMP. STAT.
1903, § 3167; VA. CODE [1904], § 2259.
64See § 6 et seq. of the statute; TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAws, p. 299.
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CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Conflict of Laws decisions regarding orders for the custody
of the children of parties to a divorce suit present interesting
questions and have developed a fair sized body of authority.
The two main questions are: (1) What constitutes jurisdiction,
in the international sense, to render a decree awarding custody
of a minor child; (2) What effect is to be given such an award
in another state?
A neglected child may be protected even against a parent
or duly appointed guardian, irrespective of residence ;65 but
such procedure is a police measure for the protection of the
child and does not work a change in the parent-child relatiofi.
But a decree awarding custody to one parent and excluding the
other deprives the latter of the society, services, and control of
the education of the child; his consent is not required even for
its adoption by another. 6 Such an important change in the
relation between parent and child is one which should be made
only at the domicile and this seems the view of the majority
of cases. Thus it has been held that the decree should not be
made when the domicile is elsewhere. 67  Decrees for custody of
children made when the child's domicile was not in the state
at the time have been denied recognition.,8 At common law
the domicile of the minor child followed the father but an in-
creasing number of statutes gives the mother equal control
over the children. This change in the law must be considered
in determining where the child whose custody is in question is
domiciled. 9
OsHartman v. Henry, 280 Mo. 478, 217 S. W. 987. Statutes on this
subject are common.
6 GSee ANN. CASES, 1914 A, 223.67People v. Winston, 52 N. Y. S. 814; Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587,
20 S. E. '187; Vetterlein, Petitioner, 14 R. L 378; Lanning v. Gregory,
100 Tex. 310, 99 S. W. 542. But see De Ia Montanya v. De Ia Montanya,
112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345. See, for additional authorities, 10 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 690 note. If the child is domiciled in the state where the cause
is pending, .the jurisdiction of the court is not defeated because the
children are not in court, whether their removal was to frustrate the
effect of the decree or any other purpose. Bennett v. Bennett, 1 Deady
299; Avery v. Avery, 33 Kan. 1; White v. White, 77 N. H. 26, 86 At.
353; Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S. E. 706.
68Kline v. Kline, 57 Ia. 386; People v. Dewey, 50 N. Y. S. 1013. See
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779.
69See 7 CORNELL L. QuAR., note on page 5, for some of these statutes.
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If the question of custody is passed upon by a court having
jurisdiction, the great weight of authority holds that the de-
cree is conclusive as to all matters up to the time of its rendi-
tion, and will be recognized and given effect in another state.
70
This seems entirely sound. To allow relitigation of the ques-
tion involves an unfortunate lack of confidence in the com-
petence of the judicial officers of a sister state, and an unduly
narrow interpretation of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. But the custody decree is conclusive only as to
matters prior to its promulgation, and does not govern when
a change of circumstances can be shown. As such a finding iq
one which can easily be made and plausibly supported, "it
follows that the recognition extra-territorially which custody
orders receive or can command is liable to be more theoretical
than of great practical consequence."
17 1
Is a modification of the custody order by the court render-
ing it to be recognized elsewhere? Difficulty is presented when
parent and child have established a new domicile in another
state. The second state is now the one concerned with the
domestic relations of the parties; yet it is difficult to see how
the first court's power is lost as long as the question of custody
remains to be passed upon.
7 2  Authority is divided upon the
question whether a modification of the decree is entitled to
recognition when a new domicile has been 
established.
7 3
70Bennett v. Bennett, 1 Deady 299; Milner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109,
76 S. E. 860; Hardin v. Hardin, 168 Ind. 352, 81 N. E. 60; State V.
District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 218 Pac. 590; Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.
Mex. 278, 142 Pac. 918; Contra, People v. Hickey, 86 Ill. App. 20;
In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308; In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126.
See "Custody of Children in Divorce Suits," 7 CoRNEL L. QuAR., 1.
Authorities on this point, and other matters involving custody of chil-
dren are collected in the,following, notes: 20 A.L.R. 815; L.R.A. 1915 B
154; 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 988.
73'Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. 1. See, illustrating this
statement, Mylinus v. Cargill, 19 N. M. 278, 142 Pac. 918; EX parte
Boyd (Tex. Ct. App.), 157 S. W. 254. For additional authorities, see
20 A.L.R. 822 note.
72It is ended by the death of the spouse to whom custody was awarded,
Pinney v. Sulzen, 91 Kan. 407, 137 Pac. 987; Clarke v. Lyon, 82 Neb.
625, 118 N. W. 472, and of course by the child becoming of age.
73That it is entitled; Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238; Stetson v.
Stetson, 80 Me. 483; State v. District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 590;
Contra, Milner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 76 S. E. 860; Griffin v. Griffin,
95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598; Groves v. Barto, 109 Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300.
See 20 A.L.R. 820 note. On securing obedience to the modified order by
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EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE ON DOWER AND OTHER
PROPERTY RIGHTS
For a divorce decree rendered in one state to affect property
rights in another, it must be assumed that the decree is recog-
nized in the second state as terminating the husband and wife
relationship of the parties. If the decree is ineffective to di-
vorce them, incidental property questions do not require con-
sideration. 74 The effect of a divorce on dower, affecting as it
does an interest in land, is necessarily governed by the lex rei
sitae. The general rule is said to be that a valid divorce cuts
off the wife's right of dower and the husband's tenancy by
curtesy, unless preserved by statute.75 This rule seems equally
applicable to a divorce secured either within or without the
state, unless changed by statute, and it has been so held,""
even when rendered against a non-resident, non-appearing
defendant 77  Respectable courts have refused to apply the
rule to the latter type of case, however, especially when no
actual notice of the action was given defendant, even though
the decree is recognized as effective in ending the marital
relation.7 8  In New York dower is regarded as a vested right,
of which the wife can be deprived only by a decree of divorce
obtained by the husband for her misconduct. Misconduct, in
requiring a bond, see L.R.A. 1915 A, 576 note. If the custody of the
child is awarded to the mother, with no provision made for its support,
may she sue the father to compel such support in a second state where
the parties are now domiciled? Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.
W. 778 says yes; see other citations, 20 A.L.R. 826.74Subject to the exception discussed supra (see note 13 for authori-
ties) where a plaintiff who has procured a decree is precluded from
questioning it.
75Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 523, 4 Sup. Ct. 598.
76Barrett v. Failing, supra (local statute preserving dower in certain
cases inapplicable to foreign divorce); Hawkins v. Ragsdale, 80 Ky. 353,
43 Am. Rep. 483; Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200; Thoms v. King, 95 Tenn.
60, 31 S. W. 983. Ace. Boyles v. Latham, 61 Ia. 174, 16 N. W. 68,
statutory substitute for dower. Applied to homestead, Gummison v.
Johnson, 149 Minn. 329, 183 N. W. 515.
77Hilbish v. Hattel, 145 Ind. 59, 44 N. E. 20; Hawkins v. Ragsdale,
supra; Gould v. Crow, supra; Thoms v. King, supra.
78Doerr v. Forsythe, 50 Oh. St. 726, 35 H. E. 1055. See Toncray v.
Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (partially overruling Thoms v.
King, supra). Accord, as applied to homestead rights, Lynn 'v. Sentel,
183 Ill. 383, 55 N. E. 838; Gooch v. Gooch, 38 Okla. 300, 133 Pac. 242.
MeCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22 S. E. 178, reaches the same result
but does not admit the validity of the divorce.
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this sense, means that which is sufficient for an absolute di-
vorce in New York-adultery; hence a divorce procured in an-
other state for another cause will not deprive the wife of
dower in New York land, owned by the husband during the
marriage. A wife, after having obtained a decree of divorce
in another state, may claim dower in New York land owned by
the husband prior to the decree,"" but not that which he sub-
sequently acquired.8'
JURISDICTION TO AWARD ALIMONY
Unlike a decree of divorce which purports only to affect only
the marital status of the parties who prior to its rendition
have been husband and wife, an order to pay money (or con-
vey property) as alimony is a personal judgment. To be ef-
fective, it must be rendered by a court having personal juris-
diction over the defendant, in addition to authority under the
local law to make such an order. Against a non-resident,
non-appearing defendant, who was not personally served with-
in the state, the order to pay alimony is void, both in the state
where rendered 2 and elsewhere. 3 This is but an application
to alimony cases of the general rule with regard to personal
79Van Cleaf v. Burns, 118 N. Y. 549, 23 N. E. 881; S. C., 133 N. Y.
540, 30 N. E. 661.
8oVan Blaricum v. Larson, 205 N. Y. 355, 98 N. E. 488, 41 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 219. But see, on basis of "quasi-estoppel" to claim the right,
Monrpe, etc. Bank v. Yoemau, 195 N. Y. S. 531, reviewed in 23 COL. L.
REv. 188.
8'Van Blaricum v. Larson, supra; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y.
503, 66 N. R. 193.
S2Fleming v. West, 98 Ga. 778, 27 S. E. 157; Proctor v. Proctor, 215
Ill. 275, 74 N. E. 145, 69 L.R.A. 673 (here the decree in addition to an
order to pay money, adjudged the plaintiff entitled to an interest in
land in another state); Johnson v. Matthews, 124 Iowa 255, 99 N. W.
1064; Sowders v. Edmunds, 76 Ind. 123; Edwards v. Edson, 104 N. Y. S.
292. Blackinton v. Blackinton, 141 Mass. 432, 5 N. E. 830 which seems
to recognize the validity of such an order in the state where rendered,
is commented upon by Mr. Justice Holmes, in his opinion in Haddock V.
Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, and see McGuinness V. McGuin-
ness, 72 N. J. Eq. 381, 68 Atl. 768.
s3Middleworth v. McDowell, 49 Ind. 386; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan.
483, 43 Pac. 779 (foreign decree purported to settle interest in Kansas
land); Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 405; Prosser V. War-
ner, 47 Vt. 667, 19 Am. Rep. 132. For collections of authorities on these
points see notes in 59 L.R.A. 178; 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 593; L.R.A. 1917 F
1161.
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judgments against a non-resident, non-appearing absentee.
Appearance by the defendant gives the court power to render
a valid personal judgment against him. 4 Further, if the de-
fendant is a resident of the state it is held in this situation,
as in other cases involving personal judgments, that the ali-
mony order is valid, even though the defendant is not served
within the state.85  If the defendant, though an absent non-
resident, has property within the jurisdiction, the local law
may authorize proceedings for seizing it for a claim for ali-
mony. The state has jurisdiction over the property within
its borders regardless of the residence or presence of the owner.
The personal decree for alimony based on constructive service
is valid against the property of the non-resident husband which
may be found within the jurisdiction of the court and specif-
ically proceeded against."" This part of the action may be re-
garded as a proceeding quasi in rem against the property.
Such seizure must, obviously, be authorized by the local law.8 7
SUIT TO RECOVER ALIMONY GRANTED BY FOREIGN COURT
Assuming a court rendering a decree for alimony had the
8 4Austin v. Austin, 173 Mich. 47, 138 N. W. 237.
15Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321; Fleming v. West, 98 Ga. 778, 27 S. E.
157; Hamill v. Talbott, 72 Mo. App. 22, 81 Mo. App. 210; Roberts v.
Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 161 N. W. 148; Contra, De la Montanya v. De la
Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345. The mode of service must con-
form to the local statutes, and must meet the requirements of due
process. The questions arising concerning the validity of a judgment
against a resident rendered without personal service within the state
are not peculiar to those for alimony, but apply to all personal judg-
ments.
8 6Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282,
L.R.A. 1917 F 1159 (bank deposit, court at time suit was filed issued
order enjoining bank from paying out any part of deposit); Holmes v.
Holmes, 283 Fed. 453 (land described in bill, notice of lis pendens
filed, and decree declared a lien on local land as authorized by statute),
noted in 21 MIcH. L. REV. 460; somewhat similar on facts is Wesner v.
O'Brien, 56 Kan. 724, 44 Pac. 1090. Further applications are found
in Rhoades v. Rhoades, 78 Neb. 495, 111 N. W. 122; Murray v. Murray,
115 Cal. 266, 47 Pac. 37; Benner v. Benner, 63 Oh. St. 220, 58 N. E.
569. But if the property itself is in no way proceeded against, it
cannot thereafter be seized to satisfy the personal judgment for alimony
which is void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant. Bunnell v.
Bunnell, 25 Fed. 214 (Cf. Holmes v. Holmes, supra); Hood v. Hood,
130 Ga. 610, 61 S. E. 471; McGuinness v. McGuinness, 72 N. J. Eq. 381,
68 Atl. 768; Edwards v. Edson, 104 N. Y. S. 292.8 7This seems the reason for the denial of relief in Chapman v. Chap-
man, 269 Mo. 663, 192 S. W. 448.
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defendant before it, either by valid personal service or volun-
tary appearance, can a suit be maintained for unpaid alimony
in another state? The chief difficulty here is in determining
whether the order for alimony is a final one, or is provisional
merely and subject to modification. An order rendered in
one state for payment of a sum of money for alimony past due
is entitled to enforcement
88 in another state under the full
faith and credit clause.
9 The rule for recovery in another
state of installments which become due subsequent to the ren-
dition of the decree may be stated by paraphrasing the author-
itative statement of the United States Supreme Court
0 on the
point: the right to such instalments becomes vested upon be-
coming due, and is therefor protected by the full faith and
credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been
made prior to the maturity of the instalments. This rule,
however, does not obtain where, by the law of the state in
which a judgment for future alimony is rendered, the right
to demand such future alimony is discretionary with the court
which rendered the decree, to such an extent that no vested
right to receive the instalments attaches.
91 The question to be
determined in a suit in one state for unpaid instalments of ali-
mony under a decree of a court from another state, is then,
whether, by the law of the state where the decree was rendered,
the right was vested to the overdue payments or was still sub-
ject to modification. If the former, recovery may be had ;92 if
8sit has been held that the action cannot be brought in equity because
the remedy at law is adequate. Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 306,
49 Atl. 501. In Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, the plaintiff recovered
in an action in equity brought in a federal court in Wisconsin upon an
order rendered by the court of another state. See, on the point, 9 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1071.
89Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183, 21 Sup. Ct. 555.
9OIn Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1068.
91The cases decided between the time of Lynde v. Lynde, supra, and
Sistare v. Sistare, supra, show some uncertainty on the subject. The
latter case clears up points left uncertain in the first. See notes,
9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1168; 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1068.
92McGregor v. McGregor, 52 Colo. 292, 122 Pac. 390; Paulin v. Paulin,
195 Ill. App. 350, citing Illinois cases; Taylor v. Stowe, 218 Mass. 248,
105 N. E. 890; Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890; Bolton
v. Bolton, 86 N. J. L. 622, 92 Atl. 389; Williamson v. Williamson, 155
N. Y. S. 423; Campbell v. Campbell, 28 Okla. 838, 115 Pac. 1111.
DIVORCE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
the latter, it may not.9 3 This may, in cases where the decree
in the state where rendered is still subject to modification
even as to past due instalments, result in permitting a de-
fendant undeservedly to escape payment of his obligations by
crossing a state line. The source of the trouble lies in the
rule allowing modification of over due instalments rather than
that governing the enforcement of the order elsewhere.
An interesting question, upon which the law is not so clear,
is raised by a case where the defendant in the divorce suit,
being personally before the court, is ordered to convey land in
another state to the plaintiff. Suppose he leaves the state
before he can be compelled to execute the conveyance. Will a
court at the situs of the land enforce the foreign decree by
compelling the defendant to execute the conveyance? The
problem is not peculiar to divorce cases though it has been
presented several times in such litigation. Against allowing
the relief it has been urged that the decree ordering the de-
fendant to convey creates only a duty to the court pronounc-
ing it; further, that to enforce such a decree is to allow one
state to create rights in land of another. For the plaintiff it
may be urged that the decree rendered with full opportunity
for the defendant to be heard is conclusive of the plaintiff's
right and defendant's obligation just as it would be had pay-
ment of money ordered; that there is no more interference by
the court rendering the decree with foreign land then there
is in any case where the conveyance made under compulsion is
recognized at the situs of the land as conveying good title;
that to decide against the plaintiff is to allow defendant to
profit by his own wrong and perhaps in effect to deprive plain-
tiff of all effective relief.94  Reslectable authority, both in de-
cisions and the opinions of legal writers, may be found for
either view.9 5
93Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92; Blever v. Blever, 27 Okla. 25,
110 Pac. 736; Levine v. Levine, 95 Ore. 94, 187 Pac. 609; Hunt v.
Monroe, 32 Utah 428, 91 Pac. 269; Henry v. Henry, 74 W. Va. 563,
82 S. E. 522.94The problem is discussed at length in "The Extra-Territorial Effect
of the Equitable Decree," 17 MIcH. L. Ray. 527; "Enforcement of a
Foreign Equitable Decree," 5 IowA L. But.. 230.95Against allowing relief: Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104, 113 N. W. 175;
Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676. Fall v. Fall went
to the Supreme Court of the United States, as Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S.
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SUIT FOR ALIMONY AFTER FOREIGN DIVORCE
A suit for alimony begun after a decree divorcing the parties
has been entered may involve two classes of cases. The first
is where both parties were before the court which granted the
divorce decree. It is held that alimony will not subsequently
be granted in the courts of the state where the decree was
rendered, when it was in issue and not ordered.
9 6 Where a
divorce suit in one state ended with a decree and a award of
alimony, the United States Supreme Court has held under the
full faith and credit clause that a further suit for alimony
could not be maintained in another state, on the principle of
the estoppel of judgments, defined as follows: "If the second
action is upon the same claim or demand as that upon which
the judgment pleaded was rendered, the judgment is an ab-
solute bar not only of what was decided but of what might
have been decided." 97
The second class of cases is that in which the decree is se-
cured at the domicile of one spouse only, the other not present
either through personal service within the state or voluntary
appearance. If the decree is not recognized in the second
state as terminating the marriage relation, no question of its
effect as precluding a suit for divorce and alimony or separate
support is raised. But if the decree is recognized as divorcing
the parties from the bonds of matrimony does it prevent a
subsequent action for alimony? Two reasons are advanced
for so holding. (1) That the right to alimony is res judicata
by the foreign decree. (2) That the dissolution of the mar-
1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, where it was held that on the facts there was no viola-
tion of full faith and credit. The rights of a third party transferee
were involved. See the concurring opinion by Holmes, J. Relief was
given in Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182 and the
recent case of Matson v. Matson, 186 Ia. 607, 173 N. W. 127, noted
in 29 YALE L. JorR. 119, 18 MICH. L. REv. 142, 33 HARv. L. REV. 420,
423. See also the authorities referred to in discussions cited in note 94.
96The authorities on this point are set out in the annotation to Spain
v. Spain, 177 Ia. 249, 158 N. W. 529, L.R.A. 1917 D 319.97Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 38 Sup. Ct. 182, reversing Bodie V.
Bates, 95 Neb. 757, 146 N. W. 1002, L.R.A. 1915 E 421. To the same
effect see Fischli v. Fischli, 1 Blackf. 360, 12 Am. Dec. 251 (while not
expressly stated that both parties appeared in the first suit, such must
have been the case for the decree was appealed from); Phillips a.
Phillips, 69 Kan. 324, 76 Pac. 842; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 83 Oh. St. 265,
94 N. E. 421.
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riage relation destroys the foundation of an independent ac-
tion for alimony. Refusal to allow the subsequent action may
result in great hardship. The husband may procure the di-
vorce at his separate domicile, and if the local law permits
service by publication only, the wife may not even know of the
suit. If she does have notice of it she has, theoretically, a
chance to appear and defend. Practically this may be not
worth much, if the distance is great and she is without means.
If the wife brings the action at her separate domicile, an order
against the non-resident absentee husband directing him to
pay alimony is void, as the cases cited above show. If he has
no property within the state, there is no way in which she
can secure alimony in the divorce action. It is hard to see
how the matter can be res judicata as to the personal claim
for alimony, where the court has no power to give a binding
judgment on thL- merits of the claim. To say the decree is
res adjudicata as to the claim for alimony is to extinguish
the claim without opportunity for its presentation.98  Author-
ities are divided, but there is adequate support for the view
that a subsequent action for alimony may be maintained,
whether the "ex parte" devorce decree was procured either by
the husband9 9 or the wife.100
Herbert F. Goodrich.
University of Michigan Law School.
9sSee Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017 and dis-
cussion in 10 CoL. L. Ray. 555.
99Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437; Thurston v. Thurston, supra; Cox v.
Cox, 19 Oh. St. 502, 2 Am. Rep. 415; Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn.
476, 131 S. W. 977. Contra, Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182;
Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N. E. 595; McCormick v. Mc-
Cormick, 82 Kan. 31, 107 Pac. 546; Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S.
551, 33 Sup. Ct. 129.
'10oWoods v. Waddle, 44 Oh. St. 449, 8 N. E. 297; Adams v. Abbott,
21 Wash. 29, 56 Pac. 931; Cf. Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac.
1079 (division of property). Contra, McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Ia. 973, 183
N. W. 377. See further for authorities the following notes, 59 L.R.A.
180; 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1106; L.R.A. 1915 E 421.
